Miriam Schoenfield
I am an Associate Professor of Philosophy at The University of Texas at Austin.
Most of my research involves using formal tools from probability theory to address questions about how to rationally form or revise our opinions in response to information. I'm particularly interested in the extent to which learning facts about our beliefs' causal history poses a skeptical challenge.
Towards the bottom of this page are some pieces aimed at a general audience.
Here is my C.V.
You can contact me by emailing mschoenfield (at) utexas.edu.
Work in Progress
Higher Order Troubles for Higher Order Defeat
Why I am Not a Boltzmann Brain
Published/Forthcoming
Forthcoming in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology
Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 7 2023
Winner of the Sanders Prize in Epistemology
Proceedings of the Aristotlean Society 2022 122(3):269-290.
(I have two pieces for a general audience on themes related to “Deferring to Doubt” and social influences on belief: a podcast for Parlia, and an article for Aeon)
Dilating and Contracting Arbitrarily - with David Builes and Sophie Horowitz
Noûs 2022 56(1): 3-20
Accuracy and Verisimilitude: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2022 73(2):373-406
Philosophers’ Imprint 2020 20(30): 1-21
Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2019 99(2): 286-297.
Winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize
An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2018 96(3): 690-715
Conditionalization does not (in general) Maximize Expected Accuracy
Mind 2017 126(504): 1155-1187
The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences*
Noûs 2017 51(4): 667-685
Bridging Rationality and Accuracy
The Journal of Philosophy 2015 112(2): 633-657
Moral Vagueness is Ontic Vagueness
Ethics 2015 126(2): 257-282
Internalism without Luminosity
Philosophical Issues 2015 25(1): 252-272
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2015 91(2): 425-55
Noûs 2014, 48(2): 193-218
Decision Making in the Face of Parity
Philosophical Perspectives 2014, 28 (1): 263 -277
Philosophical Studies 2012, 158(2): 197-219
Writing and Interviews for a General Audience
Parlia - “Can We Trust What We Believe”? (Audio)
Aeon - “Why Do You Believe What You Do”
A 1500 word article describing my views on social influences on belief.
Five Questions Podcast Episode - An interview with Kieran Setiya (Audio)
Interview with Amanda Vanstone on Counterpoint at ABC (Audio)
(starting at 27 minutes)
A discussion of some of the themes in my research for a general audience
A short piece on decision making for a blog about ants
Works No Longer in Progress
Two Notions of Epistemic Rationality
My more developed views about about the two notions of rationality that I refer to in this paper are now in a paper titled “Bridging Rationality and Accuracy” in The Journal of Philosophy. (See above). This paper, however, provides a more informal characterization that gets at a similar idea. If you'd like a copy, please email me.
*Note: there were errors in footnotes 14 and 20 in the published version of “The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.” They are corrected in the version linked here.